My favorite battlefields.

[selmaborntidefan]

I’m looking over where Pickett began his charge (at the trees a mile away). Great day here today.

 

[UAH]

I’m looking over where Pickett began his charge (at the trees a mile away). Great day here today.
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Gettysburg and Pickett's charge has always perplexed many of us. How men could be asked to cross those fences under fire and attack a fortified position that commanded the heights is a profound mystery. I have been watching a civil war history channel that reviews the writings of participants both Union and Confederate involved in the charge on that day. Longstreet delayed until the last possible moment but Lee compelled it. A difficult legacy to bear I believe.

 

[OakMtn4Bama]

Read "Lost Triumph" by Tom Carhart. Explains a theory of "why" Pickett's charge. Makes a great deal of sense to me because it was so unlike anything Lee had done before.

 

[Tidewater]

Gettysburg and Pickett's charge has always perplexed many of us. How men could be asked to cross those fences under fire and attack a fortified position that commanded the heights is a profound mystery. I have been watching a civil war history channel that reviews the writings of participants both Union and Confederate involved in the charge on that day. Longstreet delayed until the last possible moment but Lee compelled it. A difficult legacy to bear I believe.

Lee was on a roll. He had defeated a larger Union force in the Seven Days, and made them cower under the protect of Union gunboats in Jun 1862. He had trounced the Union Army at Second Manassa's. Even though greatly depleted by straggling, he had held his own at Sharpsburg in September, even though heavily outnumbered. He had a lopsided victory at Fredericksburg in December 1862. Outnumbered more than 2-1 at Chancellorsville, he had embarrassed the Union Army in May (while Longstreet and two divisions were away on Suffolk, Vir.
Lee had trounced the Union I, XI, and XII Corps on July 1. Badly mauled the Union III Corps on July 2 (and Wright's Georgia Brigade had, at one point, had made it to the top of Cemetery Ridge on July 2, but could not stay because he was not reinforced).
He was starting to believe his men could not lose.
There are some positions that cannot be taken with a frontal assault. That was one of them.
My great great grandfather was in Lew Armistead's Brigade of Pickett's Division. At sunrise, the brigade at 1,640 men. By sundown, it had 420 still in the ranks (including my GGGF). 1,220 killed, wounded, missing including General Armistead.

 

[selmaborntidefan]

Lee was on a roll. He had defeated a larger Union force in the Seven Days, and made them cower under the protect of Union gunboats in Jun 1862. He had trounced the Union Army at Second Manassa's. Even though greatly depleted by straggling, he had held his own at Sharpsburg in September, even though heavily outnumbered. He had a lopsided victory at Fredericksburg in December 1862. Outnumbered more than 2-1 at Chancellorsville, he had embarrassed the Union Army in May (while Longstreet and two divisions were away on Suffolk, Vir.
Lee had trounced the Union I, XI, and XII Corps on July 1. Badly mauled the Union III Corps on July 2 (and Wright's Georgia Brigade had, at one point, had made it to the top of Cemetery Ridge on July 2, but could not stay because he was not reinforced).
He was starting to believe his men could not lose.
There are some positions that cannot be taken with a frontal assault. That was one of them.
My great great grandfather was in Lew Armistead's Brigade of Pickett's Division. At sunrise, the brigade at 1,640 men. By sundown, it had 420 still in the ranks (including my GGGF). 1,220 killed, wounded, missing including General Armistead.

My mother and I enjoyed - thoroughly - the four hours we spent at Gettysburg last week. We got the audio tour that cues to the GPS and did the entire thing, and while it was probably longer than we intended to stay there, it was well worth it.

But as we were standing there and the narrator is going through the setting, I look down that hill and see how far those trees are and my first thought (and hers, too) was, "What kind of an idiot who has far fewer men (overall) thinks he can charge up this hill and take it when you can see the death awaiting you?"

Look, I didn't go to West Point (the toughest combat I ever had was my gut fighting with an MRE), but I just could not believe anyone could think that they could do that - not rationally.

 

[Tidewater]

In a conversation with Harry Heth in the spring of 1864, Lee said this:

If I could do so -- unfortunately I cannot -- I would again cross the Potomac and invade Pennsylvania. I believe it to be our true policy, notwithstanding the failure of last year. An invasion of the enemy's country breaks up all of his preconceived plans, relieves our country of his presence, and we subsist while there on his resources. The question of food for this army gives me more trouble and uneasiness than every thing else combined; the absence of the army from Virginia gives our people an opportunity to collect supplies ahead. The legitimate fruits of a victory, if gained in Pennsylvania, could be more readily reaped than on our own soil. We would have been in a few days' march of Philadelphia, and the occupation of that city would have given us peace." (S.H.S.P., vol. 4, pg. 153. The emphasis is mine.)

I think Lee knew that if the war became a war of attrition, the Confederacy would lose.
On the other hand, if somehow, the Confederates gained a victory at Gettysburg, the Union Army would have to retreat either (a) southeast to the defenses around Washington or (b) east across the Susquehanna, giving up Philadelphia. If Meade chose (a), then Lee could easily cur all the railroads leading into Washington from the north and starve the Army of the Potomac out. If they retreated east, then the political turmoil unleashed by losing the second largest city in the Union would have toppled the government or forced Lincoln to seek peace.
To Jefferson Davis before the campaign, Lee wrote, the Confederacy “should neglect no honorable means of dividing and weakening [its] enemies.” (O.R. XXV, Part 2, pg. 881.)

In other words, the Confederates did not have to conquer the North. They only needed to convince the North to stop trying to conquer the South. A win in Pennsylvania might well have done that.
Lee felt that was worth the gamble. But it was a heck of an ask for his troops.

 

[UAH]

In a conversation with Harry Heth in the spring of 1864, Lee said this:

If I could do so -- unfortunately I cannot -- I would again cross the Potomac and invade Pennsylvania. I believe it to be our true policy, notwithstanding the failure of last year. An invasion of the enemy's country breaks up all of his preconceived plans, relieves our country of his presence, and we subsist while there on his resources. The question of food for this army gives me more trouble and uneasiness than every thing else combined; the absence of the army from Virginia gives our people an opportunity to collect supplies ahead. The legitimate fruits of a victory, if gained in Pennsylvania, could be more readily reaped than on our own soil. We would have been in a few days' march of Philadelphia, and the occupation of that city would have given us peace." (S.H.S.P., vol. 4, pg. 153. The emphasis is mine.)

I think Lee knew that if the war became a war of attrition, the Confederacy would lose.
On the other hand, if somehow, the Confederates gained a victory at Gettysburg, the Union Army would have to retreat either (a) southeast to the defenses around Washington or (b) east across the Susquehanna, giving up Philadelphia. If Meade chose (a), then Lee could easily cur all the railroads leading into Washington from the north and starve the Army of the Potomac out. If they retreated east, then the political turmoil unleashed by losing the second largest city in the Union would have toppled the government or forced Lincoln to seek peace.
To Jefferson Davis before the campaign, Lee wrote, the Confederacy “should neglect no honorable means of dividing and weakening [its] enemies.” (O.R. XXV, Part 2, pg. 881.)

In other words, the Confederates did not have to conquer the North. They only needed to convince the North to stop trying to conquer the South. A win in Pennsylvania might well have done that.
Lee felt that was worth the gamble. But it was a heck of an ask for his troops.

It is obvious that Stuart's ride around the right flank of the Union Army at a minimum denied Lee an understanding of the ground around Gettysburg and the union forces he faced.

We can appreciate that if Lee had an intimate knowledge of the ground he would have seized the heights or moved away from Gettysburg entirely.

There is always discussion of the victory at Chancellorsville but it is important to preface that with the fact that Jackson's death there denied Lee the talent of his greatest leader in the field.

In this of course I defer to your more detailed knowledge.

 

[Padreruf]

My mother and I enjoyed - thoroughly - the four hours we spent at Gettysburg last week. We got the audio tour that cues to the GPS and did the entire thing, and while it was probably longer than we intended to stay there, it was well worth it.

But as we were standing there and the narrator is going through the setting, I look down that hill and see how far those trees are and my first thought (and hers, too) was, "What kind of an idiot who has far fewer men (overall) thinks he can charge up this hill and take it when you can see the death awaiting you?"

Look, I didn't go to West Point (the toughest combat I ever had was my gut fighting with an MRE), but I just could not believe anyone could think that they could do that - not rationally.

Lee was a genius as a general...but he had flaws like all of us. He did not think that he could be beat...doesn't work in football or in war.

 

[Tidewater]

Lee was a genius as a general...but he had flaws like all of us. He did not think that he could be beat...doesn't work in football or in war.

I think it was not so much Lee's faith in Lee (he was a genuinely humble guy), but his faith in his men. He felt they could not be beat. If he told them to do something, they did it.

 

[Tidewater]

It is obvious that Stuart's ride around the right flank of the Union Army at a minimum denied Lee an understanding of the ground around Gettysburg and the union forces he faced.

We can appreciate that if Lee had an intimate knowledge of the ground he would have seized the heights or moved away from Gettysburg entirely.

There is always discussion of the victory at Chancellorsville but it is important to preface that with the fact that Jackson's death there denied Lee the talent of his greatest leader in the field.

In this of course I defer to your more detailed knowledge.

After the war, there was something of a cottage industry among southern writers on the Gettysburg campaign. Once Lee died in 1870 and became a de facto southern saint, the belief became prevalent that Lee could do the wrong. The problem was you have to explain why Lee lost in Gettysburg. So the search was on for a scapegoat: Longstreet, Stuart, etc. Longstreet became a Republican and Jubal Early (and others) excoriated Longstreet for everything (unfairly, in my view).
Honestly, I think the Union soldiers had something to do with it. What Confederate soldier later said, "I reckon the Yankees can just shoot straighter when in the North."

 

[Padreruf]

I think it was not so much Lee's faith in Lee (he was a genuinely humble guy), but his faith in his men. He felt they could not be beat. If he told them to do something, they did it.

Yes, he was humble...but at some point faith in your men merges with faith in yourself. I have read/heard that he believed they could do anything on the battlefield. I have also seen that hill...and against those odds that belief is beyond reason, imho.