Completely incorrect.And with the standard they invented OSHA can do next to nothing because dangers are everywhere.
I'm wondering if you guys actually read the whole ruling or just the dissent.
Completely incorrect.And with the standard they invented OSHA can do next to nothing because dangers are everywhere.
Because we couldn't possibly disagree if we had read it all? Do you really think that way? That any reasonable person would surely see things the way that you do?I'm wondering if you guys actually read the whole ruling or just the dissent.
Neither, in full, but I am doing so now.Completely incorrect.
I'm wondering if you guys actually read the whole ruling or just the dissent.
They specified in the ruling as to why this new, broad power didn't fall under OSHA's control. They did not, in any way, limit OSHA's current ability.But how am I incorrect? Please be painfully specific and/or broad as you need to be.
but hey, from some folks perspective, that is all fine and goodThis is the true intent of the far right extremist justices who struck down this rule. They want to turn the clock back 100 years or more.
They are/were.Such standards must be “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment.”
They did.They are permissible, however, only in the narrowest of circumstances: the Secretary must show (1) “that employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 Per Curiam new hazards,” and (2) that the “emergency standard is necessary to protect employees from such danger.”
It takes time to formulate regulations. This seems a pretext to saying that they did not act as if there were an emergency. OTOH, they would have likely criticized too quick a response.After a 2-month delay, the Secretary of Labor issued the promised emergency standard.
Because the danger is ubiquitous in most workplaces.The regulation otherwise operates as a blunt instrument. It draws no distinctions based on industry or risk of exposure to COVID–19.
Can't remember the other option, but now we're getting to the heart of the matter - "State's rights" over federal supremacy.But employers are not required to offer this option, and the emergency regulation purports to pre-empt state laws to the contrary.
See the dissenting minority comments below.The Solicitor General does not dispute that OSHA is limited to regulating “work-related dangers.” Response Brief for OSHA in No. 21A244 etc., p. 45 (OSHA Response). She instead argues that the risk of contracting COVID–19 qualifies as such a danger. We cannot agree. Although COVID– 19 is a risk that occurs in many workplaces, it is not an occupational hazard in most. COVID–19 can and does spread at home, in schools, during sporting events, and everywhere else that people gather. That kind of universal risk is no Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022) 7 Per Curiam different from the day-to-day dangers that all face from crime, air pollution, or any number of communicable diseases. Permitting OSHA to regulate the hazards of daily life—simply because most Americans have jobs and face those same risks while on the clock—would significantly expand OSHA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.
But the target is literally everywhere in the workplace, much like air and water that could be contaminated.That is not to say OSHA lacks authority to regulate occupation-specific risks related to COVID–19. Where the virus poses a special danger because of the particular features of an employee’s job or workplace, targeted regulations are plainly permissible. We do not doubt, for example, that OSHA could regulate researchers who work with the COVID–19 virus. So too could OSHA regulate risks associated with working in particularly crowded or cramped environments. But the danger present in such workplaces differs in both degree and kind from the everyday risk of contracting COVID–19 that all face. OSHA’s indiscriminate approach fails to account for this crucial distinction— between occupational risk and risk more generally—and accordingly the mandate takes on the character of a general public health measure, rather than an “occupational safety or health standard.” 29 U. S. C. §655(b) (emphasis added).
This might be more appropriate to the other thread, but the justices seem to support democracy in some form or another.In our system of government, that is the responsibility of those chosen by the people through democratic processes.
Complete bunk with "states rights" again.JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE ALITO join, concurring. The central question we face today is: Who decides? No one doubts that the COVID–19 pandemic has posed challenges for every American. Or that our state, local, and national governments all have roles to play in combating the disease. The only question is whether an administrative agency in Washington, one charged with overseeing workplace safety, may mandate the vaccination or regular testing of 84 million people. Or whether, as 27 States before us submit, that work belongs to state and local governments across the country and the people’s elected representatives in Congress. This Court is not a public health authority. But it is charged with resolving disputes about which authorities possess the power to make the laws that govern us under the Constitution and the laws of the land.
It's in the law. See dissenting opinion of the minority.On the one hand, OSHA claims the power to issue a nationwide mandate on a major question but cannot trace its authority to do so to any clear congressional mandate. On the other hand, if the statutory subsection the agency cites really did endow OSHA with the power it asserts, that law would likely constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
Bingo!JUSTICE BREYER, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN, dissenting. Every day, COVID–19 poses grave dangers to the citizens of this country—and particularly, to its workers. The disease has by now killed almost 1 million Americans and hospitalized almost 4 million. It spreads by person-to-person contact in confined indoor spaces, so causes harm in nearly all workplace environments. And in those environments, more than any others, individuals have little control, and therefore little capacity to mitigate risk. COVID–19, in short, is a menace in work settings.
I concur, not that much of anyone cares.So the administrative agency charged with ensuring health and safety in workplaces did what Congress commanded it to: It took action to address COVID–19’s continuing threat in those spaces. The Occupational Safety and BREYER, J., dissenting 2 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS v. OSHA BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting Health Administration (OSHA) issued an emergency temporary standard (Standard), requiring either vaccination or masking and testing, to protect American workers. The Standard falls within the core of the agency’s mission: to “protect employees” from “grave danger” that comes from “new hazards” or exposure to harmful agents. 29 U. S. C. §655(c)(1).
Thank you.Yet today the Court issues a stay that prevents the Standard from taking effect. In our view, the Court’s order seriously misapplies the applicable legal standards. And in so doing, it stymies the Federal Government’s ability to counter the unparalleled threat that COVID–19 poses to our Nation’s workers. Acting outside of its competence and without legal basis, the Court displaces the judgments of the Government officials given the responsibility to respond to workplace health emergencies. We respectfully dissent.
And the justices here can back their claim with both the statute and court precedent, unlike the activist majority.In 1970, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act (Act) “to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources,” including “by developing innovative methods, techniques, and approaches for dealing with occupational safety and health problems.” 29 U. S. C. §§651(b), (b)(5). To that end, the Act empowers OSHA to issue “mandatory occupational safety and health standards applicable to businesses affecting interstate commerce.” §651(b)(3). Still more, the Act requires OSHA to issue “an emergency temporary standard to take immediate effect upon publication in the Federal Register if [the agency] determines (A) that employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents de- Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting termined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards, and (B) that such emergency standard is necessary to protect employees from such danger.” §655(c)(1). Acting under that statutory command, OSHA promulgated the emergency temporary standard at issue here.
Twisting of facts is what the majority does best on this court. This undercuts their arguments.The Standard thus encourages vaccination, but permits employers to adopt a masking-or-testing policy instead. (The majority obscures this choice by insistently calling the policy a “vaccine mandate.” Ante, at 1, 4, 7, 8.) Further, the Standard does not apply in a variety of settings. It exempts employees who are at a reduced risk of infection because they work from home, alone, or outdoors. See 86 Fed. Reg. 61551. It makes exceptions based on religious objections or medical necessity. See id., at 61552. And the Standard does not constrain any employer able to show that its “conditions, practices, means, methods, operations, or processes” make its workplace equivalently “safe and healthful.” 29 U. S. C. §655(d). Consistent with statutory requirements, the Standard lasts only six months. See §655(c)(3).
But the activist court acted anyway.The legal standard governing a request for relief pending appellate review is settled. To obtain that relief, the applicants must show: (1) that their “claims are likely to prevail,” (2) “that denying them relief would lead to irreparable injury,” and (3) “that granting relief would not harm the public interest.” Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (per curiam) (slip op., at 2). Moreover, because the applicants seek judicial intervention that the Sixth Circuit withheld below, this Court should not issue relief unless the applicants can establish that their entitlement to relief is “indisputably clear.” South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief ) (slip op., at 2) (internal quotation marks omitted). None of these requirements is met here.
Seems clear, but not to the majority.The applicants are not “likely to prevail” under any proper view of the law. OSHA’s rule perfectly fits the language of the applicable statutory provision. Once again, that provision commands—not just enables, but commands—OSHA to issue an emergency temporary standard whenever it determines “(A) that employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards, and (B) that such emergency standard is necessary to protect employees from such danger.” 29 U. S. C. §655(c)(1). Each and every part of that provision demands that, in the circumstances here, OSHA act to prevent workplace harm.
Agreed.The agency showed, in meticulous detail, that close contact between infected and uninfected individuals spreads the disease; that “[t]he science of transmission does not vary by industry or by type of workplace”; that testing, mask wearing, and vaccination are highly effective— indeed, essential—tools for reducing the risk of transmission, hospitalization, and death; and that unvaccinated employees of all ages face a substantially increased risk from COVID–19 as compared to their vaccinated peers. Id., at 61403, 61411–61412, 61417–61419, 61433–61435, 61438– 61439. In short, OSHA showed that no lesser policy would prevent as much death and injury from COVID–19 as the BREYER, J., dissenting 6 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS v. OSHA BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting Standard would. OSHA’s determinations are “conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.” 29 U. S. C. §655(f ). Judicial review under that test is deferential, as it should be.
The minority justices know their stuff and the majority make themselves look like buffoons, contradicting their very own precedents.The Court does not dispute that the statutory terms just discussed, read in the ordinary way, authorize this Standard. In other words, the majority does not contest that COVID–19 is a “new hazard” and “physically harmful agent”; that it poses a “grave danger” to employees; or that a testing and masking or vaccination policy is “necessary” to prevent those harms. Instead, the majority claims that the Act does not “plainly authorize[]” the Standard because it gives OSHA the power to “set workplace safety standards” and COVID–19 exists both inside and outside the workplace. Ante, at 6. In other words, the Court argues that OSHA cannot keep workplaces safe from COVID–19 because the agency (as it readily acknowledges) has no power to address the disease outside the work setting. But nothing in the Act’s text supports the majority’s limitation on OSHA’s regulatory authority. Of course, the ma- Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022) 7 BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting jority is correct that OSHA is not a roving public health regulator, see ante, at 6–7: It has power only to protect employees from workplace hazards. But as just explained, that is exactly what the Standard does. See supra, at 5–6. And the Act requires nothing more: Contra the majority, it is indifferent to whether a hazard in the workplace is also found elsewhere. The statute generally charges OSHA with “assur[ing] so far as possible . . . safe and healthful working conditions.” 29 U. S. C. §651(b). That provision authorizes regulation to protect employees from all hazards present in the workplace—or, at least, all hazards in part created by conditions there. It does not matter whether those hazards also exist beyond the workplace walls. The same is true of the provision at issue here demanding the issuance of temporary emergency standards. Once again, that provision kicks in when employees are exposed in the workplace to “new hazards” or “substances or agents” determined to be “physically harmful.” §655(c)(1). The statute does not require that employees are exposed to those dangers only while on the workplace clock. And that should settle the matter. When Congress “enact expansive language offering no indication whatever that the statute limits what [an agency] can” do, the Court cannot “impos[e] limits on an agency’s discretion that are not supported by the text.” Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 16) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). That is what the majority today does—impose a limit found no place in the governing statute.
I had not read any part of this dissent prior to my posts above. I did not know about the specific part of the ARPA that specifically authorized OSHA to take action on this. This completely flies in the face of what the majority claimed and makes them either incompetent and/or liars. How much more clear could Congress have been in authorizing OSHA to make these rules and regs?!!! The majority argument completely falls apart here.Consistent with Congress’s directives, OSHA has long regulated risks that arise both inside and outside of the workplace. For example, OSHA has issued, and applied to nearly all workplaces, rules combating risks of fire, faulty electrical installations, and inadequate emergency exits— even though the dangers prevented by those rules arise not BREYER, J., dissenting 8 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS v. OSHA BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting only in workplaces but in many physical facilities (e.g., stadiums, schools, hotels, even homes). See 29 CFR §1910.155 (2020) (fire); §§1910.302–1910.308 (electrical installations); §§1910.34–1910.39 (exit routes). Similarly, OSHA has regulated to reduce risks from excessive noise and unsafe drinking water—again, risks hardly confined to the workplace. See §1910.95 (noise); §1910.141 (water). A biological hazard—here, the virus causing COVID–19—is no different. Indeed, Congress just last year made this clear. It appropriated $100 million for OSHA “to carry out COVID–19 related worker protection activities” in work environments of all kinds. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. 117–2, 135 Stat. 30. That legislation refutes the majority’s view that workplace exposure to COVID–19 is somehow not a workplace hazard. Congress knew—and Congress said— that OSHA’s responsibility to mitigate the harms of COVID–19 in the typical workplace do not diminish just because the disease also endangers people in other settings.
Again, I had not read this prior to my comments above.OSHA determined that the virus causing COVID–19 is “readily transmissible in workplaces because they are areas where multiple people come into contact with one another, often for extended periods of time.” Id., at 61411. In other words, COVID–19 spreads more widely in workplaces than in other venues because more people spend more time together there. And critically, employees usually have little or no control in those settings. “[D]uring the workday,” OSHA explained, “workers may have little ability to limit contact with coworkers, clients, members of the public, patients, and Cite as: 595 U. S. ____ (2022) 9 BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting others, any one of whom could represent a source of exposure to” the virus. Id., at 61408. The agency backed up its conclusions with hundreds of reports of workplace COVID– 19 outbreaks—not just in cheek-by-jowl settings like factory assembly lines, but in retail stores, restaurants, medical facilities, construction areas, and standard offices. Id., at 61412–61416. But still, OSHA took care to tailor the Standard. Where it could exempt work settings without exposing employees to grave danger, it did so. See id., at 61419–61420; supra, at 3. In sum, the agency did just what the Act told it to: It protected employees from a grave danger posed by a new virus as and where needed, and went no further. The majority, in overturning that action, substitutes judicial diktat for reasoned policymaking.
The ruling directly conflicts with Congressional action.The result of its ruling is squarely at odds with the statutory scheme. As shown earlier, the Act’s explicit terms authorize the Standard. See supra, at 4–6. Once again, OSHA must issue an emergency standard in response to new hazards in the workplace that expose employees to “grave danger.” §655(c)(1); see supra, at 2–4. The entire point of that provision is to enable OSHA to deal with emergencies—to put into effect the new measures needed to cope with new workplace conditions. The enacting Congress of course did not tell the agency to issue this Standard in response to this COVID–19 pandemic—because that Congress could not predict the future. But that Congress did indeed want OSHA to have the tools needed to confront emerging dangers (including contagious diseases) in the workplace. We know that, first and foremost, from the breadth of the authority Congress granted to OSHA. And we know that because of how OSHA has used that authority from the statute’s beginnings—in ways not dissimilar to the action here. OSHA has often issued rules applying to all or nearly all workplaces in the Nation, affecting at once many tens of millions of employees. See, e.g., 29 CFR §1910.141. It has previously regulated infectious disease, including by BREYER, J., dissenting 10 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS v. OSHA BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting facilitating vaccinations. See §1910.1030(f ). And it has in other contexts required medical examinations and face coverings for employees. See §§1910.120(q)(9)(i), 1910.134. In line with those prior actions, the Standard here requires employers to ensure testing and masking if they do not demand vaccination. Nothing about that measure is so outof-the-ordinary as to demand a judicially created exception from Congress’s command that OSHA protect employees from grave workplace harms. If OSHA’s Standard is far-reaching—applying to many millions of American workers—it no more than reflects the scope of the crisis. The Standard responds to a workplace health emergency unprecedented in the agency’s history: an infectious disease that has already killed hundreds of thousands and sickened millions; that is most easily transmitted in the shared indoor spaces that are the hallmark of American working life; and that spreads mostly without regard to differences in occupation or industry.
Underlying everything else in this dispute is a single, simple question: Who decides how much protection, and of what kind, American workers need from COVID–19? An agency with expertise in workplace health and safety, acting as Congress and the President authorized? Or a court, lacking any knowledge of how to safeguard workplaces, and insulated from responsibility for any damage it causes?
And the dissenting justices completely destroy their "reasoning".They specified in the ruling as to why this new, broad power didn't fall under OSHA's control. They did not, in any way, limit OSHA's current ability.
But short of declaring martial law, government can’t control “everywhere”; it can and does control the workplace.Basically that the virus is everywhere, not just particularly in a workplace...
OSHA is not some sort of all-powerful governing body over private businesses. They set regulations for worker safety, and while some think that should include vaccination, the SCOTUS determined it should not (outside of healthcare workers).But short of declaring martial law, government can’t control “everywhere”; it can and does control the workplace.
They actually said that OSHA applied the requirement too broadly and that it was not specifically tailored enough for their liking. Of course, they also said Congress had not authorized OSHA to address the pandemic but that is a lie since Congress made the authorization in ARPA. Seems like sloppy work to me to miss the authorization they claimed does not exist, but what's done is done I guess.OSHA is not some sort of all-powerful governing body over private businesses. They set regulations for worker safety, and while some think that should include vaccination, the SCOTUS determined it should not (outside of healthcare workers).
I fully understand why people feel it should be otherwise.
You asked me what their rationale was...But short of declaring martial law, government can’t control “everywhere”; it can and does control the workplace.
And in fact, there is a separate requirement for employee vaccinations that would apply to that company. It's not going to be enforced while pending litigation goes on.I think that's what it came down to. There just wasn't enough federal contact. I represent one company with several hundred workers involved in government contracts. Following the court's reasoning, they would be covered. And you are correct - the 1905 Jacobson case involved a state's power to mandate, Mass., IIRC...
I wasn't clear. I meant that that mandate would continue, given the court's holding. One customer, the largest, is delaying enforcement pending litigation. Another one is enforcing it anyway...And in fact, there is a separate requirement for employee vaccinations that would apply to that company. It's not going to be enforced while pending litigation goes on.
If they get their way, they'll get "Loving" repealed. If that happens, well, I haven't ever witnessed a public lynching (I'm 58) but I imagine this one will be on National TV.Yep - conservative justices would be fine going back to the original version, with blacks as slaves, women as property and all the power residing with the states. And, yes, I know that one is black and another a woman. They are too stupid to realize where their views would put themselves if they really got what they want.
These people are human garbage.
Goodness, do you have any thing showing that this is the case or this just another example of emotional, reactionary posting because something didn't go your way?If they get their way, they'll get "Loving" repealed. If that happens, well, I haven't ever witnessed a public lynching (I'm 58) but I imagine this one will be on National TV.
I think that this is where we are as a country. If you stand with the GOP in any way, then you support racism. That is what the GOP is. And it is not out of hate, but out of a desire to retain power.It's one thing to hate on something someone does, but to suggest they're all racist is a bit much.
Extreme view, but I'll yield it as it really doesn't matter wrt this conversation. Therefore, once again I'll point out that you seem to be conflating 'republican' with 'conservative'. Despite overlap, there's a difference.I think that this is where we are as a country. If you stand with the GOP in any way, then you support racism. That is what the GOP is. And it is not out of hate, but out of a desire to retain power.