Tactical contexts matter.
Lee was trying to destroy the AoP at Chancellorsville because an attritional model was a losing game for the Confederates.
Overall, Grant lost more men between 5 May and 15 June than Lee had in his entire army.
Grant gets credit for continuing the campaign, despite the carnage (He could afford the casualties. Lee could not).
Grant's system was (1) grossly outnumber your opponent (In the Vicksburg campaign, Grant had 150,000 men, Pemberton has 30,000; at the Wilderness, Grant had 118,700, Lee had 66,140) and (2) remain on the strategic offensive and never mind your casualties no matter how bad they are (see point 1). By the time they got to Petersburg, the Union VI Corps was the only one fit for attacking. The rest had been bled dry and could generally hold trenches, but could not attack them so Grant just stretched the lines further than Lee could (especially after the wave of Confederate desertion after Lincoln's re-election.
As for Grant's applicability for today, there are not many opponents the US can outmuscle and trade casualties at the rate of 17 US to 11 enemy and win. The US could in 1864, but those conditions are no longer applicable today.
Wade Hampton made what I find an convincing point. Keep the two sides exactly the same on May 5, 1864 (manpower, strategic objectives) and swap the commanders (and only the commanders). A Grant-led ANV does not survive past Christmas.
But here is the thing. Every Civil War general grew up with studying Napoleon and Clausewitz. War from 1815 and 1861 doesn’t make some huge change. Napoleon in the War of the Third Coalition is probably at his greatest and the Battle of Austerlitz is probably his greatest achievement. Lee and many Southern generals took the fallout of the Battle of Austerlitz as proof that battles could end wars but failed to realize that 1) Napoleon lost very few people at the battle by risking an insane strategy and 2) Austerlitz is a random point on the map with very little economic and political importance. The South mostly based a strategy fully off of defending Virginia which was an insanely stupid idea because all the union had to do is cut off Virginia and let it die a painful death. Had Meade lost at Gettysburg, then it doesn’t change the outcome of the war or where the war is fought in 1864. Vicksburg falling and Georgia howling was far more important. All Gettysburg did was decimate the Army of Northern Virginia to the point that Grant could lean on them with numbers in 64.
As far as equal numbers… too many variables to consider. I mean even with the above paragraph, let’s change the outcome of Gettysburg and Grant probably fights 1864 differently. But what is not up for debate is the fact that Grant’s Vicksburg campaign is one of the greatest military campaigns by an American general in history.
But the point I was making is that the Southern strategy to win these battles with these “charge of the light brigade” like charges and defend Virginia was not any smarter or sound war strategy than the Union generals who based their whole strategy around trying to fight them on their terms. The Civil War is like the Second Punic War in how egotistical generals on one side ignore the obvious strategy to defeat the adversary and instead prolonged his reign of terror until the obvious strategy is finally implemented.
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