But here is the thing. Every Civil War general grew up with studying Napoleon and Clausewitz. War from 1815 and 1861 doesn’t make some huge change. Napoleon in the War of the Third Coalition is probably at his greatest and the Battle of Austerlitz is probably his greatest achievement. Lee and many Southern generals took the fallout of the Battle of Austerlitz as proof that battles could end wars but failed to realize that 1) Napoleon lost very few people at the battle by risking an insane strategy and 2) Austerlitz is a random point on the map with very little economic and political importance. The South mostly based a strategy fully off of defending Virginia which was an insanely stupid idea because all the union had to do is cut off Virginia and let it die a painful death. Had Meade lost at Gettysburg, then it doesn’t change the outcome of the war or where the war is fought in 1864. Vicksburg falling and Georgia howling was far more important. All Gettysburg did was decimate the Army of Northern Virginia to the point that Grant could lean on them with numbers in 64.
As far as equal numbers… too many variables to consider. I mean even with the above paragraph, let’s change the outcome of Gettysburg and Grant probably fights 1864 differently. But what is not up for debate is the fact that Grant’s Vicksburg campaign is one of the greatest military campaigns by an American general in history.
But the point I was making is that the Southern strategy to win these battles with these “charge of the light brigade” like charges and defend Virginia was not any smarter or sound war strategy than the Union generals who based their whole strategy around trying to fight them on their terms. The Civil War is like the Second Punic War in how egotistical generals on one side ignore the obvious strategy to defeat the adversary and instead prolonged his reign of terror until the obvious strategy is finally implemented.
All valid points. The introduction of the rifled musket made the tactical offensive much deadlier than the smoothbores of Napoleon's day. See Alabama's own Grady McWhiney's
Attack and Die and Paddy Griffith's
Battle Tactics in the American Civil War.
I think the difference between Lee and Grant was that Lee saw the essentially political nature of war. The spring of 1863 saw a groundswell of Copperheads or "peace Democrats." Lee before the Gettysburg Campaign had written Jeff Davis: The Confederacy “should neglect no honorable means of dividing and weakening our enemies.’* (O.R. XXV, Part 2, pg. 881.)
Later, Lee spoke with Harry Heth about the Gettysburg Campaign, “The legitimate fruits of a victory, if gained in Pennsylvania, could be more readily reaped than on our own soil. We would have been in a few days’ march of Philadelphia, and the occupation of that city would have given us peace.” (
S.H.S.P.,volume 4, pg. 153.) The Confederacy was never going to outmuscle the Union strategically. Their best hope was to convince significant portions of the North that forcing the South back into the Union was simply not worth the effort and to aid Peace Democrats in making that argument.
Grant on the other hand, while fighting a war to keep people in the Union (where they would eventually become citizens again) while embracing "hard war" to achieve victory. Punishing citizens into loyalty is a politically counterproductive way to proceed. Endorsing Sherman's plans to "make Georgia howl" and ordering Sheridan to reduce the Shenandoah Valley to a desert: "eat out Virginia clean and clear as far as they go, so that crows flying over it for the balance of the season will have to carry their own provender with them." Grant also told Sheridan, "Do all the damage to railroads and crops you can. Carry off stock of all descriptions, and negroes, so as to prevent further planting. If the war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren waste." All this despite the Lieber Code's orders not to wantonly destroy private property.
The KKK and a Solid South for a century were the foreseeable results. Grant/Sheridan/Sherman won the war, but poisoned the subsequent peace.
